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I. INTRODUCTION

“Friday was hell for me . . . I had all my money frozen. I am being treated like a criminal.”1

That was the reaction of Mr. Ocampo, the former finance minister of Colombia and a former
World Bank presidential nominee, when his bank account was terminated just because of his
status as a Politically Exposed Person (PEP).

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) first introduced the
concept of PEPs in 2003—without distinction between domestic and foreign officials—as part
of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulations to address potential proceeds of corruption
being laundered through financial institutions. It required financial institutions to exercise
Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) against PEPs in carrying out their duty to provide Suspicious
Activities Reports (SAR) to a government.2 In the same year, the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) provided for the regulation of foreign PEPs in its ‘40 Recommendations’ that have
been widely adopted as the AML standard by more than 190 jurisdictions. 3 Other intergovernmental and private entities have also adopted their own standards for PEP regulation.4

Tom Braithwaite & John Paul Rathbone & Gina Chon, JPMorgan shuts foreign diplomats’ accounts,
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 6, 2014), available at https://www.ft.com/content/3a8f975c-d523-11e3-adec00144feabdc0 (last visited Mar.23, 2017).
2
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art.52.1, Oct. 31, 2003, A/58/422.
3
See Financial Action Task Force [FATF], FATF 40 Recomendations, Recommendation 5, at 5 (2003),
available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf; FATF,
Countries, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
4
A qausi-public organization (e.g. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) and a private organization
(e.g. Wolfsberg Group) came up with its own AML/PEP standard. See e.g., Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, A brief history of the Basel Committee, at 1 (July 2013), available at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf; The Wolfsberg Group, Global Banks: Global Standards,
http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2017).
1
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While such global AML/PEP regulations set by diverse types of global regulatory
bodies aim to detect and deter corrupt PEPs, they can have a tremendously negative impact on
many innocent PEPs, particularly foreign PEPs, as illustrated in the anecdote of Mr. Ocampo
in the United States. Following these global standards, US AML legislation requires financial
institutions to apply EDD against foreign PEPs.5 Both the global and domestic PEP regulations
themselves do not require financial institutions to terminate the relationship with PEPs but only
to apply EDD. However, due to the significant compliance costs of identifying PEPs coupled
with an increased risk of serious fines against compliance failures, financial institutions have
voluntarily made business judgements to terminate. For instance, in 2014, JPMorgan simply
chose to close the Chase accounts and stop serving all current and former non-US senior
government officials. 6 HSBC has taken a similar path against foreign officials, including
diplomats in the US, for years.7

Detection and deterrence of corruption through AML/PEP regulation does not
necessarily cause such collateral damage to innocent PEPs. Actually, AML/PEP regulation
could avoid, or at least minimize, the collateral damage while maximizing deterrence of
corruption, if high degrees of coordination along two dimensions are satisfied: the trans-border,
and between public enforcement entities and private actors. In other words, the first dimension
requires AML/PEP regulations to be harmonized at the global level; the second dimension
demands the harmonized global AML/PEP regulations to embrace two-way information
sharing between a government and private financial institutions instead of one-way reporting
by financial institutions to a government.

5
6
7

31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2012).
Supra note 1.
Id.
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However, fairly large discrepancies, both in substantive and procedural rules, exist
among the global standards of AML/PEP regulation. These discrepancies lead to variance in
the compliance rate of states with AML/PEP regulation generating overall a low compliance
rate.8 As correctly pointed out by the World Bank, “the current variations among approaches
serve as both a good excuse not to act and are seen by some as a real impediment to the
development and implementation of effective PEPs controls.”9

The cornerstone change to fulfil high degrees of coordination along the dimensions
was made in February 2012 by the inclusion of domestic PEPs in FATF Recommendations.10
With regards to the first dimension, though gaps on the precise definition of PEPs still remain,11
the recommendation reconciled the main substantive discrepancy on the scope of PEPs—
whether to embrace domestic PEPs in addition to foreign PEPs—in global AML/PEPs
standards. In addition, information on domestic PEPs, unlike foreign PEPs, is information in
possession of governments as it mainly concerns its own employees and officials. Accordingly,
the inclusion of domestic PEPs into FATF Recommendations also provided a foundation for
coordination along the second dimension: forming two-way information sharing by providing
requisite governmental information—domestic PEPs lists—to financial institutions with a duty
to report suspicions of corruption to the government.

See Theodore S. Greenberg & Larissa Gray, et al., Stolen Asset Recovery, Politically Exposed Persons: A
Policy Paper on Strengthening Preventive Measures, at 7, 17 (2009) available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSARI/Resources/5570284-1257172052492/PEPsful.pdf?resourceurlname=PEPs-ful.pdf.
9
Id. at xv.
10
See FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism &
Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations, Recommendation 12, at 16 (Feb. 2012) available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
11
Supra note 8, at 18-19, 27-29 (Illustrating discrepancies between international PEPs standards in defining to
what extent the family members and close associates of PEPs, military officers, judiciary and diplomats should
be categorized as PEPs).
8
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Such coordination along both dimensions would eliminate key factors normally
influencing financial institutions’ to exercise their business judgement—such as the
tremendous compliance costs and difficulties in identifying PEPs as well as the increased risk
of serious fines for compliance failures—thereby negatively affecting many innocent PEPs
while maximizing corruption deterrence.

Yet, the discussions needed to build on this cornerstone by pursuing coordination
along the second dimension have been lacking in academia.12 This paper offers some policy
recommendations on this timely topic.

Part II clarifies the rationale behind the global AML/PEP regulations imposing a
higher level of a duty to report on financial institutions specifically against corruption. In
addition, it assesses coordination on the substantive definition of PEPs provided in different
types of global AML/PEP standards. Based on this trans-border coordination along the first
dimension, Part III develops the argument for coordination along the second dimension
between public government authorities and private financial institutions. As current global
AML/PEP regulations require only financial institutions to share their information with public
authorities, this paper focuses on incorporation of sharing requisite governmental information
with private financial institutions into global AML/PEP regulation. Considering the

12

Few academic scholarships deal with the problems of PEP regulations. However, much of the debates in the
academic scholarships study problems of PEP regulations in a broader context lacking a profound analysis on
PEP regulations. See Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 503, 525 (2011);
Richard K. Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 699, 737 (2008). Even a literature specifically focusing on PEP regulations tends to repeat the
argument—variance among approaches between international standard setters—made by the reports of standard
making bodies or their affiliates. See Paul L. Lee, A Renewed Focus on Foreign Corruption and Politically
Exposed Persons, 127 BANKING L.J. 813, 820 (2010). Professor Matthew Stephenson navigated the possibility
of a Public Registry of PEPs by contradicting the comment of David Lewis, the Executive Secretary of FATF,
who disregarded such possibility. However, it was rather to open a discussion in an informal setting. Matthew
Stephenson, Should There Be a Public Registry of Politically Exposed Persons?, THE GLOBAL
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 7, 2016), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/06/07/should-there-be-apublic-registry-of-politically-exposed-persons/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
5

characteristics of PEPs information, it illustrates why and how this coordination between public
authorities and private financial institutions at the global level should be made.

II. TRANS-BORDER COORDINATION: HARMONIZATION OF GLOBAL
AML/PEP REGULATIONS

A. Corruption, Money Laundering and Global Administrative Law

Defining corruption, which is a reflection of social phenomena, organizational
structure and personal behavior, is difficult. There have been efforts by scholars to provide
definitions of corruption in a broad sense. According to the definition by Nye, corruption is a
“behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of privateregarding . . . pecuniary or status gains.”13 Klaveren defines corruption as a civil servant using
its office as an income maximizing unit,14 and Friedrich defines corruption as “where a power
holder . . . take[s] actions which favour whoever provides the rewards [not legally provided
for].”15

Various scholars have defined corruption in their own ways, but many of those
definitions have a common denominator, which is “private economic gain.” Thus, as in many
other profit-generating crimes, money laundering is an essential part of corruption—domestic
or foreign—because its proceeds are to be hidden from detection of law enforcement
authorities.16

Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417,
419 (1967).
14
Acob Van Klaveren, The Concept of Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION : A HANDBOOK, at 25-26 (A. J.
Heidenheimer et al. ed, 1989).
15
C. J. Friedrich, Political Pathology, 37:1 THE POL. Q. 70, 74 (1966).
16
See generally D. Chaikin & J. Sharman, CORRUPTION AND MONEY LAUNDERING: A SYMBIOTIC
RELATIONSHIP (2009).
13
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Due to globalization and rapidly developing technologies, financial instruments are
moving rapidly across borders in huge volumes. Although the exchange of clean money
between people, institutions and corporations has tremendously increased for many legitimate
purposes, it has also provided criminals with opportunities to shop for favorable jurisdictions.
This, in turn, has led to deterioration in the detection rate for crime, which is an essential
component of crime deterrence.17

Many corruption cases have demonstrated that corrupted officials, whether from
developing18 or developed countries,19 are laundering illegally gotten gains in diverse ways
using financial institutions and other intermediaries in both domestic and foreign jurisdictions
to hide their sources. The negative effect of money laundering and related predicate crimes, in
this case corruption, extends beyond one state. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
explains that it could undermine the stability of a country’s financial system or its broader
economy in a number of ways and may have adverse spillover effects on global stability; it
gives the examples of Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, the Dominican Republic and
Greece.20

Thus, corruption that is supported by money laundering in this integrated global
economy has developed into a global problem requiring strong trans-border regulatory

Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 779 n.22 (1997) (“[I]ndividuals . . . are more deterred by a high probability of
a relatively low sanction than a low probability of a very high sanction.”) (citing JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD
J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME & HUMAN NATURE 397-401 (1985)).
18
FATF, Specific Risk Factors in the Laundering of Proceeds of Corruption, at 14, 15 (July 2012) available at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Pr
oceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf. (providing corruption cases of James Ibori, a former governor of Delta State
in Nigeria and Lazarenko, a former prime minister of Ukraine).
19
See U.S. v. Randall Harold Cunningham aka Randy "Duke" Cunningham, no. 05cr2137-LAB (S.D.Cal, Nov.
28, 2005), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/crim/uscnnghm112805cinf.pdf.
20
International Monetary Fund, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism inclusion
in surveillance and financail stability assessments-Guidance Note, at 5-6 (Dec. 14, 2012), avialble at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/121412a.pdf.
17
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coordination, which is being shaped by a “growing body of Global Administrative Law
[(GAL)].”21 After the Cold War, academic and policy debates have centered around corruption
in developing countries, and the typical solution was mostly pursued “in the context of [a
domestic] governance framework.” 22 This holistic governance approach focused on the
“nature of functioning of a state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making
processes, policy formulation, implementation capacity, information flows, effectiveness of
leadership, and the nature of the relationship between rulers and the ruled.”23 However, to
effectively tackle the contemporary problem of corruption, growing interdependence means
that global governance can only be attained by strong trans-border regulatory coordination.

From the perspective of corruption deterrence, the next section focuses on how PEP
regulation as a part of global AML regulation has evolved and whether it has achieved the
required strong regulatory coordination at the global level.

B. Trans-border Coordination of Global AML/PEP Regulations

i. PEP Regulation: a Special AML Tool for Corruption Deterrence

The manifest relationship between corruption and money laundering across diverse
jurisdictions, as explained above, shows that global AML regulation would be an effective way
of controlling corruption. To prevent criminals from easily evading detection by law
enforcement authorities, financial institutions are required to assist law enforcement authorities
by reporting suspicious activities under global AML regulation. However, this still does not

Benedict Kingsbury & Nico Krisch & Richard B.Stewart, The emergence of global administrative law, 68 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
22
Aland oding & Stephen Riley, Corruption and Ant-corruption Strategies: Issues and case studies from
Developing Countries, in CORRUPTION & INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at
45, 47 (United Nations Pubns, 1998).
23
Id. at 46.
21
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provide an explanation as to why corruption requires special attention in relation to global
AML regulation when corruption is just one of many predicate crimes of money laundering.

Specifically targeting only corruption, global AML regulation embraced PEP
regulation to impose a higher level of due diligence duty, EDD, on financial institutions against
transactions made with PEPs. As AML has to go through a risk-based analysis, EDD could
actually be triggered by many other risk factors: the client’s business industry or country of
origin, destination or origin country of transaction, etc. However, PEP is the only factor which
AML regulations explicitly name for financial institutions to consider in applying EDD and
which is adopted to deter one specific crime, corruption. Though equally important as PEP,
most of the risk factors are not explicitly named by AML regulations as an EDD triggering
factor. While AML regulations manifestly require the transaction made with a correspondent
account for certain foreign banks24 to be under EDD, like PEP, it is not to deter any specific
crime.

This distinct treatment of corruption from the AML perspective is justified and
underpinned by the seriousness of corruption and the low corruption detection rate. The serious
corrosive effect of corruption to the global community across diverse sectors, not limited to the
economy, is widely acknowledged. The negative effect of corruption on economic
development has been extensively proven in so far as corruption reduces a country’s
attractiveness for making investments, capital accumulation, capital inflows, productivity of
capital, and economic welfare all of which are interrelated.25 In addition to its negative effect
on economic development, corruption “prevents people [particularly the most vulnerable and
marginalized people] from fulfilling their political, civil, social, cultural and economic

24

31 CFR 1010.610 (b).
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption in Empirical Research — A Review, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
(November 1999) available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/d2ws1_jglambsdorff.pdf.
25
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rights.”26 Such harms caused by corruption have been recognized by the international society
as illustrated in the message of the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Kimoon, that “[c]orruption destroys opportunities and creates rampant inequalities and
undermines human rights and good governance, stifles economic growth and distorts
markets.”27

While society as a whole is a victim of corruption, there is no identifiable victim to
report the crime of corruption. Victim reporting is the main source of crime detection. However,
most acts of bribery, one of the most common criminal acts of corruption, which is many times
interchangeably used with corruption,28 have no identifiable victim. For instance, a car driver
paying a bribe to a police officer to avoid a traffic offense does not generate any direct victim.
Even in those cases where potential or actual individual victims of bribery exist, the victims
might fail to recognize the harm caused by the bribery to them. For instance, when a company
has paid a bribe to a government officer to win a government contract, it is difficult for other
bidding competitors to know about the existence of bribery and the chain of causation between
the bribe and the winning of the contract. The same is true, though to a lesser extent, for other
types of criminal acts of corruption, such as abuse of authority or embezzlement.

Thus, to complement the lower detection rate for corruption, which undoubtedly
causes serious damage to our society, a higher level of AML duty of financial institutions
against PEPs is justified. In addition, the recent global trend of active and strong enforcement
actions against corruption makes it particularly essential,29 as the willing corrupted officers

26

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the
Connection, at 23 (2009) available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/40/131_web.pdf.
27
Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, In Message For International Anti-Corruption Day, Says Prevention
Critical To Securing Rule of Law, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/14703 (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14703.doc.htm.
28
Supra note 26, at 17.
29
See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, Anti-bribery and corruption: global enforcement and legislative
developments 2017, at 2 (2017), available at
10

and bribers are expected to put more efforts into laundering the illicit money to avoid such law
enforcement actions. Where offenders are struggling to avoid detection and victims to report
are largely absent, the higher AML duty against PEPs imposed on financial institutions as third
party witnesses of corruption is imperative.

ii. Possibilities and Limitations of Global AML/PEP Regulations for Transborder Coordination

Traditionally, administrative measures have been adopted at the domestic level solely
by a government. However, as crimes are globalized, these administrative regulations,
including AML/PEP regulation adopted as an instrument to deter crimes are increasingly made
at the international level by various international actors to remove legal loopholes through
strong trans-border coordination: thus, there has been a process of harmonization of domestic
regulations.

To deter crimes of money laundering and corruption moving freely across borders, a
broad range of international actors30 have came up with their own forms of global AML/PEP
standards. Not only government agencies vested with treaty making authority, normally a
ministry of foreign affairs, but also pure domestic administrative agencies and private financial
institutions have become constantly involved with one another.

However, trans-border coordination of the AML/PEP regulations is not an easy task
due to discrepancies between two main global standards: UNCAC and FAFT recommendations.
In 2003, the UNCAC introduced the concept in relation to PEPs that “each State Party . . .

http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Campaigns/GI/content/GI%20ABC%20guide%202016.PD
F; TRACE INTERNATIONAL REPORT, Global Enforcement Report 2016, at 8 (2017), available at
https://traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/TRACEGlobalEnforcementReport2016_1.pdf.
30
See I. p.1.
11

[shall] require banks . . . to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or
on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and
their family members and associates.”31

The FATF soon followed the UNCAC by adopting

a PEP standard in its Recommendation 6 of the FATF’s 40 Recommendations, which required
financial institutions to exercise enhanced due diligence against PEPs, defined as “individuals
who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country . . . .”32

In addition to other still remaining discrepancies not explored in this paper,33 the main
discrepancy between UNCAC and FATF recommendations was whether to include domestic
PEPs within the PEP definition. While UNCAC did not make a distinction between foreign
and domestic PEPs, the FATF recommendations clearly limited the PEP regulation to foreign
PEPs.

These discrepancies led to a low compliance rate with global PEP regulation34 thus
lowering the level of trans-border coordination. As correctly pointed out by the World Bank,
“the current variations among approaches serve as both a good excuse not to act and are seen
by some as a real impediment to the development and implementation of effective PEPs
controls.” 35 As illustrated by the abovementioned corruption cases, these gaps are easily
abused by corrupted officers.

However, in February 2012, this main substantive discrepancy was reconciled by the
inclusion of domestic PEPs into the FATF Recommendations. The FATF revised its
Recommendations to require financial institutions to “determine whether a customer or

31
32
33
34
35

Supra note 2 (emphasis added).
Supra note 3, at 17 (emphasis added).
Supra note 11.
Supra note 8.
Supra note 9.
12

beneficial owner is a domestic PEP . . . [and] to apply the [EDD] measures . . . [to such
persons].”36

That reconciliation is the focus of this research. It helps international society to
consider the reality instead of the “myth” that foreign PEPs are risky but domestic PEPs are
safe.37 More importantly, as domestic PEP lists are information possessed by governments by
their very nature, since they are mainly about government employees, the inclusion of domestic
PEPs into FATF Recommendations provides a foundation to incorporate the public-private
coordination along the second dimension—forming two-way information sharing by providing
domestic PEP lists to financial institutions who have a duty to report suspicious activities to
public authorities—into global AML/PEP regulation.

III. PUBLIC-PRIVATE COORDINATION: SHARING OF GOVERNMENTAL PEP
LISTS WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Global AML/PEP regulations require a sharing of information owned by financial
institutions with public authorities by mandating reporting of suspicious activities to public
authorities. This is one-way coordination between the public and private sectors.

To achieve two-way coordination, this paper focuses on the other means for
coordination—sharing requisite governmental information with financial institutions—which
is currently lacking. This section will study why and how this two-way coordination between
public authorities and private financial institutions should be incorporated into global
AML/PEP regulation. To do so, this paper suggests specific procedural and institutional

Supra note 10.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative
for Asia and the Pacific, at 2 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanticorruptioninitiative/meetingsandconferences/44442190.pdf.
36
37
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recommendations to minimize the collateral damage to innocent PEPs while securing
maximum corruption deterrence.

A. Why Public-Private Coordination under Global AML/PEP regulation?

One possible answer to the above question is that public-private coordination could
prevent negative impacts on innocent PEPs by decreasing the compliance cost of financial
institutions and increasing the completeness of PEP list. Circling back to the introduction, the
bank account of Mr. Ocampo, Columbia’s former finance minister and former World Bank
presidential nominee, was terminated by JPMorgan merely because of his status as a PEP. Not
only Mr. Ocampo but many others have been similarly categorized as PEPs whose accounts,
(totalling approximately 3,500) were affected by the ban from JPMorgan. 38 Mr. Ocampo and
many others are not criminals, but in line with his reaction to JPMorgan’s actions, they were
also unfairly treated like criminals simply because of their status as PEPs.39 It was not just
JPMorgan, but also HSBC that have taken similar paths for years against foreign officials
including diplomats in the US.40

This termination of the relationship with PEPs is not intended but actually discouraged
by PEP regulations. For instance, the UNCAC clarified that “[s]uch enhanced scrutiny . . .
should not be so construed as to discourage or prohibit financial institutions from doing
business with any legitimate customer.”41 The FATF also emphasized that PEP regulations
are “preventive (not criminal) in nature, and should not be interpreted as stigmatizing PEPs as
such being involved in criminal activity. Refusing a business relationship with a PEP simply

38
39
40
41

Supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 2.
14

based on the determination that the client is a PEP is contrary to the letter and spirit of
Recommendation 12.”42

However, due to the tremendous compliance costs incurred with the identification and
monitoring of PEPs, coupled with an increased risk of serious fines for compliance failures,
financial institutions have voluntarily made such business judgements, thereby negatively
affecting innocent PEPs, particularly foreign PEPs, or even false-PEPs wrongly listed as
PEPs.43

To identify PEPs, monitor and update the continuously changing PEP information,
each financial institution bears expensive personnel costs to carry out their in-house PEP
analysis.44 Regarding the category of domestic PEPs, which has been recently added to the
FATF recommendations, it would be relatively easy and less expensive for the domestic
financial institutions to gain the relevant information since they know the language, culture,
and governmental system, etc. However, foreign PEPs present a different challenge.
Identification and monitoring of foreign PEPs is a daunting task for the employees of financial
institutions as the information needed to monitor them encompasses all foreign jurisdictions,
often with unfamiliar language, culture, and governmental systems, etc.

Thus, some financial institutions instead rely on a PEP database service of Commercial
Data Providers (CDP), such as World-Check, World Compliance, Accuity, etc., which is

FATF, FATF Guicance Politically Exposed Persons(Recommendation 12 and 22), at 3 (2013), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-PEP-Rec12-22.pdf.
43
See David Artingstall, Nick Dove, John Howell & Michael Levi, Drivers & Impacts of Derisking, at 7, 11
(February 2016) https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/drivers-impacts-of-derisking.pdf.
44
See Rupert de Ruig, The New Step by Step Approach to Client Screening, DOW JONES WATCHLIST, 3 (2008)
(explaining people cost for financial institutions to carry out general watch-list client screening using vendor
services), http://factiva.com/en/cp/collateral/files/djwl_whitepaper_en.pdf. The people cost will be much higher
for financial institutions not using vendor services, as additional human resources are required to carry out the
services what they buy from the vendors.
42
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regarded as costly.45 Though the fee may vary between CDPs, use of such services imposes a
huge financial burden on financial institutions, as properly expressed by the World Council of
Credit Unions in its letter to the Basel Committee expressing its opposition to the mandatory
use of vendor-created PEP lists implied by the Basel Committee’s “Sound management of risks
related to money laundering and financing of terrorism” consultative document.46

Furthermore, reports from the World Bank47 and the FATF48 recommend financial
institutions to maintain in-house analysis even when they are using CDP databases.
Accordingly, overall AML/PEP compliance costs for the financial industry would be massive.

However, this high-cost endeavor of financial institutions to identify and monitor PEPs
is necessarily incomplete because it is limited to the information publicly available or provided
by the clients.49 In particular, and for the same reasons that the cost of PEP identification and
monitoring is higher for foreign PEP lists than domestic PEP lists, the degree of incompleteness
concerning the PEP identification and monitoring would be higher for foreign PEP lists than
for the domestic PEP lists. This has been properly recognized by the US Senate Subcommittee
investigation on the corruption case of Omar Bongo, President of Gabon, wherein it was
observed, “[s]ome vendors relied on by U.S. financial institutions to screen clients for PEPs
used incomplete and unreliable PEP lists.”50

Supra note 8, at 46. (“the entire package of services—the database, software, and staff to review the hits—
can became quite a costly venture.”).
46
See WORLD COUNCIL OF CREDIT UNION, Re: Consultative Document: Sound management of risks related to
money laundering and financing of terrorism (bcbs 252), at 2, (Sept. 27, 2013), available at
https://www.woccu.org/documents/WOCCU_Basel_AML.
47
Supra note 8, at 46.
48
Supra note 42, at 17.
49
Supra note 8, at 45-46.
50
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Cases Histories, at 3 (2010) available at
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-psi-staff-report-keeping-foreign-corruption-out-of-the-unitedstates-four-case-histories.
45
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Accordingly, even with their expensive AML/PEP compliance efforts, financial
institutions are exposed to an increasing risk of serious fines for AML/PEP compliance failures.
Though the enforcement action differs by jurisdiction, in the case of the US whose enforcement
action as a center of international banking indeed affects not only US financial institutions but
also non-US financial institutions operating in the US, the regulators have aggressively
enforced AML measures for non-compliance.51 Moreover, the penalties for non-compliance
by financial institutions have risen sharply since late 2009.52

The risk of serious fines together with the incompleteness of PEP identification,
particularly regarding foreign PEPs, motivates financial institutions to act defensively by
giving the benefit of the doubt and overly broadening the PEPs list. With the active and strong
enforcement of AML breaches, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has
been concerned with defensive actions of financial institutions by reporting low quality SAR.53
A similar defensive action could be manifested in PEP listings, thus increasing the risk of even
false-PEPs being wrongly listed as PEPs.

Despite the abovementioned concerns, review systems to prevent overly broadened
PEP lists have not been established in global AML/PEP regulations. Considering the negative
effects on the persons listed, particularly false-PEPs, law may be needed to regulate financial
institutions to prevent such harm. The law may not direct financial institution’s business
judgement whether to maintain business with PEPs or not, but the law may dictate procedures
that financial institutions should follow in making PEP lists to maintain accountability and to
protect false-hit clients. This is even more important when no public scrutiny is available, since

Sharon Brown-Hruska, Developments in Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement and
Litigation, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, at 2 (June 2016) available at
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/PUB_Developments_BSA_AML_Lit-06.16.pdf.
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financial institutions and CDPs are reluctant to provide information on the criteria, indicators,
or the process of establishing PEP lists to the public as it is a protected business secret.
Nevertheless, no state certifies or authorizes the PEP list or PEP listing procedures of financial
institutions and CDPs. Financial institutions are not required to give notice to the clients who
are registered as PEPs; to give reasons why the customers are registered as PEP. Even clients
mistakenly listed as PEPs are not given an opportunity to ask financial institutions for a review
or delisting.

The overly broadened PEP identification only makes a vicious circle of increasing the
already expensive monitoring cost of financial institutions. It is unable to improve the inherent
incompleteness of PEP monitoring, thus it fails to curtail the risk of serious fines for noncompliance. This combination of high cost of PEP monitoring and risk of serious fines has led
financial institutions, even big ones such as JPMorgan, to voluntarily terminate business with
individuals identified as PEPs, particularly foreign PEPs, who are mostly innocent or wrongly
identified as PEPs.

Public-private coordination incorporated into global AML/PEP regulation could
prevent such negative impacts on innocent PEPs including the false-PEPs, as it would decrease
the compliance costs of financial institutions and increase the completeness and integrity of
PEP lists. For public-private coordination, governments would share domestic PEP lists with
financial institutions that have a duty to report suspicious activities to a government. Domestic
PEP list-making by government would cost a lot less, perhaps almost nothing, as domestic
PEPs are employees of the government. Needless to say, the lists would be comprehensive and
complete.

B. A Global Regulatory AML/PEP Body for Public-Private Coordination
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i. A Framework of Global Public-Private Coordination: Mutual Recognition of
Domestic PEP Lists

The sharing of domestic PEP lists made by governments is not limited to sharing with
domestic financial institutions, but also with other foreign financial institutions. This is not to
say that governments should come up with a list of both domestic and foreign PEPs and share
it with domestic financial institutions. When it comes to foreign PEPs, obtaining a
comprehensive list would be a daunting task for governments. Incorporating a duty on
governments to issue a list of foreign PEPs to share with their domestic financial institutions
into the global AML/PEP regulation is neither practical nor reasonable for the rationales
discussed below.

First and foremost, a government does not possess the requisite information to issue a
foreign PEPs list. As foreign PEPs are the employees of foreign governments, without sharing
by foreign governments of their own domestic PEPs list—which is what I suggest—a
government needs to rely mainly on public information just as financial institutions do. In
addition, corruption has a cultural aspect, which sometimes may not be easily understood by
foreigners, and each government system is different from one another. Thus, it is difficult for
a government, as it is for financial institutions, to know in which parts of foreign governments
corruption exists or in which sectors it is most prevalent and who has the authority which can
be most readily abused for personal gain.

Secondly, although a government may have better sources of information on foreign
PEPs through its agencies cooperating with foreign governments or collecting foreign
intelligence than financial institutions that are solely relying on publicly available information,
such gathering of information—more specifically, identifiable information—on foreign senior
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officers would still be incomplete, financially costly and sometimes politically risky. More
importantly, the information secretly gathered would remain confidential, which undermines
the fundamental ground for public-private coordination.

Accordingly, this paper suggests each government should establish its own domestic
PEP list and share it with domestic and foreign financial institutions that are in need of such
information to carry out their AML/PEP duties to report suspicions of corruption under the
global AML/PEP regulations. With the inclusion of domestic PEPs into FATF
recommendations, there seem to be stronger justifications for such public-private coordination.

For this purpose, mutual recognition should be the basic framework of this global
public-private coordination as it provides the principles governing the recognition of foreign
laws, regulations, standards and certification procedures among states. 54 The especially
important aspect of mutual recognition is that it would allow us to live with our differences 55
but within the limits set by the international standards; this could provide great benefit for
global AML/PEP regulation, as corruption is to some extent culturally specific to each society.
This mutual recognition would be operationalized in a manner whereby the domestic PEP list
created by each government would be recognized by foreign financial institutions, and
obviously by domestic financial institutions as well.

ii. Caveats on a Global AML/PEP Regulatory Body

For successful implementation of global public-private coordination based on mutual
recognition of domestic PEPs lists, the global AML/PEP regulatory body, whether it is the UN

Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without
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or the FATF, should respect three essential values: accountability of states providing the list to
foreign states/financial institutions, accountability to the listed domestic PEPs and protection
of the privacy of the PEPs. In order for each of these three values to be realized, the global
AML/PEP regulatory body would need to introduce certain institutional and procedural
measures into its regulations. Neglecting these values and failure to embrace the required
institutional and procedural measures would result in the global AML/PEP regulatory body’s
failure to attain legitimacy and effectiveness. Each of the three key values is discussed in turn
below.

a. Accountability to Other States

The global public-private coordination suggested in this paper is premised on the
assumption that all states will provide the complete, authentic and reliable information of
domestic PEPs without cheating others receiving the information. To see whether and how—
under which institutional and procedural manners—states would be motivated to do so, it is
necessary to first consider the characteristics of the information being shared by states.

Mainly, the domestic PEP list consists of sensitive information in relation to which it
is difficult to establish trust—the essential component of information sharing 56 —between
states: states providing the information and states receiving the information. This lack of trust
compromises the completeness and authenticity of the shared information.

The domestic PEP list to be shared generally should include identifiable information
about the senior government officials of each state. Though there exists a lack of harmonization

See Panteli & Sockalingam, Trust and conflict within virtual inter-organizational alliances: a framework for
facilitating knowledge sharing, 39 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 599 (2005); Dirks & Ferrin, The Role of Trust in
Organizational Settings, 12 ORG. SCI., 450 (2001); Dale E. Zand, Trust and Managerial Problem Solving, 17
ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 229 (1972).
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in the PEP definitions of global standards, the common core of PEPs, which are agreed upon
even among diverse definitions, is that PEPs are the senior government officials. The PEP list
is the identifiable information—names, positions, dates of birth, identification numbers and
photos—of those individuals so that bank tellers could use the information to discern whether
the client is a PEP or not.

As national interest shapes behaviors of states competing with each other,57 states are
not likely to voluntarily and unilaterally share the complete, authentic and reliable information
on their senior officers, particularly but not limited to, in the field of national security—military
or intelligence—, with other states. The states providing the domestic PEP list would be
anxious about abuse of the shared information by the foreign states receiving the information
against the interest of the providing states.

Then, the question arises, will there be a formalized agreement to impose a duty on
states to share domestic PEPs lists and will this be incorporated into global AML/PEP
regulations?

As deterrence of corruption through strong AML is a public good 58 which benefits
every constituent of this interconnected international society, 59 states are incentivized to
mutually share the requisite PEP information. However, as long as the risk of harm to their
national interests by sharing exists, states will enter into such agreements only when the
incentives eclipse such risk.

Anne L. Herbert, Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas and Franck, 14
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Furthermore, even when formalized information sharing is attained through the global
AML/PEP regulatory body, upholding trust between states is not guaranteed. States may freely
breach such duty by cheating and withholding some information to pursue their own national
interests,60 as a supra-national government with law enforcement authority is lacking from
international society. However, pursuing state self-interest would not be the only reason for
such non-compliance. As domestic political interest obviates the enforcement of international
law at the domestic level,61 there exists the risk of a ruling party of the state providing the
domestic PEP list and abusing its power to prepare the list unfairly and partially to suppress
opposition parties. This concern about possible cheating reinforces the motivation of states not
to enter into a formalized information sharing agreement.

Accordingly, for the formalized information sharing agreement to be operationalized,
institutional and procedural measures would have to be adopted to reduce the concerns of states:
the risk of harm to their national interests and potential cheating by other states.

First of all, to prevent states from cheating and to encourage compliance, it is essential
for the global AML/PEP regulatory body to supervise state practices with “an auditing device
that checks at an appropriate frequency the integrity of the data submitted by the participants
and penalizes by an appropriate amount the cheating behaviors.”62

To check the domestic PEP list prepared by each state, the global AML/PEP regulatory
body needs a centralized repository of international PEP lists managed by itself rather than
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decentralized international PEP data centers managed by each state. The former is where states
proactively provide and simultaneously update the data of domestic PEP lists to the
international PEPs data center to which access by all financial institutions is allowed. The latter
is where each state establishes its own international PEPs data center utilizing the domestic
PEPs data shared by foreign states and allows access by its domestic financial institutions.

Checks by the global AML/PEP regulatory body under the decentralized international
PEP data centers, apart from its apparent high management cost from the perspective of an
international society,63 are less likely to overcome the problems of cheating by, and distrust
between, states. In contrast to the proposed centralized international PEP data center where the
information would be audited by the global AML/PEP regulatory body and identical
information would be accessed by financial institutions, a global AML/PEP regulatory body
under the decentralized international PEP data centers has to rely on the reactive information
provided by states in response to periodic audit requests. This leaves room for states to cheat
by providing the information detached from the actual information accessed by financial
institutions. To prevent such cheating, the verification of the integrity of the reactive
information requires on-site inspections. However, on-site inspections are not only expensive,
but also conditioned upon active cooperation from states, which is not guaranteed.

To appropriately penalize non-compliance by states, the global AML/PEP regulatory
body would require authority to impose FATF-style soft sanctions. As the stake involved with
global AML/PEP regulation is small compared to international laws on war crimes or territorial
limits,64 it does not necessarily need to be a military or economic sanction, but a soft sanction.
A good example would be mutual evaluation and the ‘naming and shaming’ utilized by the
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FATF, one of the global AML/PEP regulatory bodies, to make member states (and sometimes
even non-member states) comply with its recommendations.65

Secondly, to eliminate, or at least to minimize the risk of harm to their national interests
by sharing, it is essential for the centralized international PEP data center managed by the
global AML/PEP regulatory body to remove the unnecessary involvement of states. Financial
institutions would be allowed to directly, not indirectly through their own domestic states,
access and query the international PEP data center. As it is the financial institutions, not states,
which have the responsibility to detect suspicious corruption by utilizing the PEP list, there is
no reason for the PEP list to be indirectly processed through the states to reach the financial
institutions. This will address the concerns of states providing the domestic PEP lists about
possible abuse of the shared information by the receiving states. Supported by the supervisory
role of the global AML/PEP regulatory body, the international PEP data center will help to
achieve this objective by preventing states from cheating, such as coercing their domestic
financial institutions to provide the PEP information shared by foreign states.

b. Accountability to the Listed PEPs

The second value that must be respected by the proposed AML/PEP regulatory body
is accountability to the listed PEPs. As illustrated in the previous section, all current privately
collated PEP lists (whether they be created in-house or sourced commercially from CDPs) are
in need of procedural measures to secure accountability to the innocently listed PEPs,
particularly the false-PEPs.66 This is due to the high possibility of financial institutions overly
broadening their lists of PEPs and treating them as criminals. The public-private coordination
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proposed in this research would largely eliminate the roots of such possibility by decreasing
compliance costs and enhancing the completeness of the PEP lists. However, the suggested
public-private coordination wherein states establish a list of domestic PEPs and share those
with domestic and foreign financial institutions will still be required to embrace procedural
measures to secure accountability to the listed PEPs.

Accountability to the listed PEPs is required as a matter of principle in administrative
law under the suggested public-private coordination, unlike the former argument that
accountability to the listed PEPs was desirable as a matter of policy to protect wrongly listed
PEPs under the privately created PEP lists.67

As a part of domestic governance,68 discretionary decisions of administrative agencies
are required as a principle of administrative law to be made “in a manner that is informed and
responsive to the wide range of social and economic interests and values affected by their
decision.” 69 Many international organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the
OECD have emphasized this principle of accountability is to be upheld by states.70

The suggested public-private coordination involves an administrative decision, which
requires an exercise of discretion by an administrative agency affecting the rights and interests
of the subject of the decision. In deciding whom the domestic PEPs are, the administrative
agency needs to exercise its discretion. It is not comparable with the list of, say, sex offenders
whose cases have been previously decided and reviewed by the judiciary,71 or the list of stolen
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passports, which are reported by the victims of crime about objective facts.72 Once someone
is subjected to the domestic PEP list, the listed PEPs will be under higher surveillance by
financial institutions. In addition, though less probable under the public-private coordination
than privately made PEP lists, thanks to decreasing compliance costs and increasing
completeness of the PEP lists, there still remains a risk of PEPs being disabled from carrying
out daily financial activities.

Accordingly, the suggested public-private coordination should respect the
accountability principle. More importantly, such accountability measures should be embraced
particularly by the global AML/PEP regulations at the international level, not simply by an
individual state at the domestic level.

The domestic PEP list issued by a state under the suggested public-private coordination
would not simply be a domestic administrative decision, but a global administrative decision
with international ramifications. Each state’s decisions regarding their domestic PEP lists
would be mutually recognized by financial institutions in foreign states. Such decisions would
impact not only upon the behaviors of domestic financial institutions, but also on foreign
financial institutions to comply with a regulatory AML duty. Therefore, their decisions would
affect the rights and interests of the listed PEPs not only domestically, but also internationally.

However, as “the domestic system of political and legal accountability and control . . .
would apply to purely domestic regulatory measures”73 not to the global regulatory measures,
the global AML/PEP regulatory body adopting the proposed public-private coordination would
need to employ measures at the international level to secure accountability by respecting the

DEPT. OF STATE, Privacy Impact Assessment: Online Passport Lost & Stolen System, at 2 (2008), available at
https://foia.state.gov/_docs/pia/onlinepassportloststolensystem_oplss.pdf.
73
Supra note 69, at 69.
72

27

values of “transparency, participation, reasoned decision and decisional review.”74 To do so,
and having learned lessons from other similar types of global administrative decisions
generally described as a type of GAL, the proposed global AML/PEP regulatory body should
incorporate the following: procedural measures requiring states to secure accountability at the
domestic level and independent international procedural measures to secure accountability at
the international level.

First, embracing the procedural requirements to secure accountability into global
AML/PEP regulation is necessary for the global AML/PEP regulatory body to control the
different domestic PEP list review procedures of each state. Some global regulatory bodies, to
increase accountability and transparency, have begun to adopt administrative law decision
making and rule-making procedures75 with “which national authorit[ies] should conform in
order to assure their compliance and accountability with the international regime.”76

Such procedural control by the global regulatory body would be essential to overcome
the inherent weakness of mutual recognition as procedural differences in list making by states
may easily lead a state to deny recognition of another state’s administrative decisions. For
instance, the case involving Shengen lists elucidated the importance of procedural control at
the international level. In the Hamssaoui and Forabosco cases, the French Conseil d’Etat ruled
against the lawfulness of the entry on the SIS made by another Member-state, Germany, based
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on the fact that Germany failed to provide sufficient information for the claimant regarding the
listing of the claimant in the Shengen system.77

There are various specific procedures that would need to be embraced and
implemented by the global AML/PEP regulation, as illustrated below, and it is worth noting
that those procedural measures are feasible and practical only when states make their own
domestic PEP lists, as suggested in this paper, but not foreign PEP lists. Procedural safeguards
to attain transparent and non-discriminatory administrative decisions, such as participation of
opposing party members or civil groups in PEP list making is practical only with domestic PEP
lists. In addition, notice to the affected individual is required to make informed and responsive
administrative decisions. However, with regards to foreign PEP list making, it is difficult to
require states to give notice to all those foreign PEPs from all around the world. From the
perspective of listed foreign PEPs, it is suggested that they should receive notice from each
state and then petition for a review to each foreign state where they are listed as PEPs. By
comparison, when states prepare domestic PEP lists, they are required to give notice
respectively only to their domestic personnel. It is also much easier for the listed PEPs to
petition for review and hold the decision maker accountable at the domestic level.

However, procedural control by the global regulatory body will fail to overcome the
inherent weakness of mutual recognition, when the required accountability procedures are not
actually implemented by states. Thus, without monitoring the state’s implementation, a global
AML/PEP regulatory body will fail to achieve the contractual norm for mutual recognition.78
While accountability to other states requires such a supervisory role of a global AML/PEP
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regulatory body to monitor the substance of the listed PEP, this accountability to the listed
PEP demands the same supervisory role against the procedure of PEP list making.

Secondly, the proposed global AML/PEP regulatory body needs to establish its own
independent international procedural measures to secure accountability at the international
level. In contrast to the other procedures to secure accountability, such as notice and
participation, which are to be properly adopted at the domestic level, the petition could be made
even, or sometime necessarily, at the international level in addition to the domestic level.

For instance, the UN Security Council (SC) 1267 Committee has been criticized for
its lack of accountability in compiling a consolidated list of terrorist individuals and entities to
be sanctioned.79 The list is prepared and publicized by the SC 1267 committee based on the
information supplied by states, and the sanction imposed on such listed individuals and entities
is carried out by the private sector who accesses the publicized list. 80 To be delisted, the
individuals requesting delisting have to go through a complicated process both at the domestic
and the international level. 81 Thus, to secure accountability, the committee reformed its
procedure by supplying the listed individuals and entities a channel, the Office of
Ombudspersons, to make a direct petition and review request for delisting.82

The global AML/PEP regulatory body should create an international body, like the
Office of the Ombudsperson of the SC 1267 committee, to work as a direct channel of petition

See Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear
Procedures, WATSON INSTITUTE TARGETED SANCTIONS PROJECT 3, 21-22 (2006) available at
http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf; Iain Cameron, Protecting Legal Rights:
on the (in)security of targeted sanctions, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM 189 (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005).
80
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
81
See E. Alexandra Dosman, For the Record: Designating “Listed Entities” for the Purposes of Terrorist
Financing Offenses at Canadian Law, 62 U. TORONTO FAC. OF L. R. 1, 13 (2004).
82
U.N. Office of the Ombudsperson of the S.C.’s 1267 Comm., Office of the Ombudsperson to the SIL (Da'esh)
& Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
79

30

for review from the listed PEPs. The pubic-private coordination involved in a global AML/PEP
regulatory body suggested in this paper is similar to the SC 1267 committee in that the list of
individuals provided by states are accessed and used by the private sector in a way to negatively
affect the rights and interests of the listed individuals. Thus, to overcome the expected similar
accountability barrier, the global AML/PEP regulatory body will be in need of its own Office
of the Ombudsperson.

c. Protection of the Privacy Rights of PEPs

The third value that must be respected is the protection of the PEPs’ privacy rights.
Under the current AML/PEP regime where financial institutions or CDPs prepare the PEP list,
privacy issues are not triggered. This is because the financial institutions or CDPs gather the
requisite personal identifiable information (PII) about PEPs from public sources thus rendering
the PEP list incomplete in many cases. Financial institutions allow access by their employees
to the information in identifying clients as PEPs and higher due diligence is applied in carrying
out their AML duties to detect corruption. They do not publicize the information but keep it as
a business secret. However, even if they do publicize it, no invasion of privacy will occur, since
it is based on already publicly available information.

In contrast, the suggested global AML/PEP regulatory body with pubic-private
coordination where the PEP list is shared by states with financial institutions could possibly
cause privacy concerns. While the PEP list would be more complete, since it contains
information about their own employees, the information possessed and disclosed by states is
not limited only to information that is already in the public domain.
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To clarify the position, it is necessary to find out whether the PII about PEP should be
protected from disclosure or disclosed to financial institutions for public interest as an
exception.

The protection of PII from disclosure is not subject to an absolute but rather limited
protection. Although art. 17 of the ICCPR does not contain a permissible limitation clause, the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression recognizes permissible limitations on the right to privacy, subject to necessary,
legitimate and proportionate restrictions.83

The three conditions of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality stipulated in the
ICCPR are more specifically described by domestic courts. In the US, particularly in relation
to exposing the records of public officers, the courts have interpreted the three conditions as
follows:

[whether] the party seeking to come within the protection of the right to [privacy] ha[s]
a legitimate expectation that the materials or information will not be disclosed”;
“[whether] disclosure [is] nonetheless required to serve a compelling state interest”;
and “[whether] the necessary disclosure occur[s] in that manner which is least intrusive
with respect to the right to [privacy].84

With regards to the first step of the inquiry, the PEPs as public officers are expected
to have a lower level of legitimate privacy expectation than ordinary people. Thus, the
suggested global AML/PEP regulatory body with pubic-private coordination, which shares the
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information about PEPs, could be justified more easily when compared with sharing the same
information about ordinary people.

Generally the information about a civilian—name, date of birth, identification numbers,
address, phone number, and financial status, etc.—is regarded as protected PII of which access
and disclosure is strictly limited, even though the privacy law of each state differs in its scope
and level of privacy protection.85 Ordinary people have a legitimate expectation that the PII
will not be disclosed. Thus, the PEP list is clearly a type of protected PII, but it is specifically
about PEPs.

However, publication of the same information about public officers has been made
legitimate in many cases. For instance, the laws of many states require public officers to declare
their assets, which includes information about their name, address, account number and
location of assets, etc., and to allow public access to such information, though to different
degrees by states due to privacy concerns.86 Similarly, federal87 and some state laws88 in the
US explicitly allow public inspection of information about state employees such as their names
and position titles, their current and prior positions, the dates of appointment and resignation,
etc. Even regarding the information about the public employee’s home/work address 89 or
income of their family, 90 the US courts have, in differentiating public employment from
private employment, denied the reasonable privacy expectations of public employees.
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When the first inquiry is satisfied, the disclosure could be justified by passing muster
of the second and third inquiries. In other words, even the protected PII information about PEPs,
such as race,91 full birth dates92 or phone numbers93 could possibly be disclosed to satisfy a
compelling state interest by employing the least privacy intrusive measure.

This part focuses on the third inquiry of the least intrusive measure since the second
inquiry of compelling interest in disclosing the information about PEPs (i.e. deterrence of
corruption and money laundering) is thoroughly described throughout this paper. 94 The
measures that are least intrusive to the privacy of PEPs would be employed with appropriate
procedures to control to whom and how the disclosure should be made.

In the matter of to whom, it is suggested that the disclosure should be limited to the
least number of parties required to accomplish the compelling interest of corruption deterrence.
The best possible procedural measure in this respect would be to allow disclosure to financial
institutions through the global AML/PEP regulatory body working as a centralized repository
of an international PEP list.

Ideally, the privacy of PEPs would be best protected under the decentralized domestic
PEP data center95 with each state establishing its domestic PEPs list and allowing direct access
to both domestic and foreign financial institutions. This direct sharing would not involve
unnecessary additional intermediaries, such as the global AML/PEP regulatory body, other

See CBS, Inc. v. Partee (1990, 1st Dist) 198 Ill App 3d 936, 145 Ill Dec 30, 556 NE2d 648, 52 BNA FEP Cas
1534, 17 Media L R 2051.
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See Delaware County v. Schaefer ex rel. Philadelphia Inquirer, 45 A.3d 1149, 40 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1670
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
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See Office of Governor v. Raffle, 65 A.3d 1105 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
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See II.A., pp.5-7.
95
This decentralized domestic PEP data center should be differentiated from the decentralized international
PEP data center discussed in the prior section. See III.B.2.a., p.23.
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than domestic and foreign financial institutions who are the ultimate users of the information
to deter corruption.

However, apart from the expected lack of accountability to other states, 96 these
decentralized domestic PEP data centers do not seem plausible. Each state would be required
to maintain its own domestic PEP data center, which would be expected to incur high
management costs.97 Much of the expensive costs incurred by each of 196 states worldwide
are in fact an unnecessary overlap, which could be eliminated by having just one centralized
international PEP data center.98

It is contended here that among the indirect sharing procedures, sharing through the
proposed global AML/PEP regulatory body as an international PEP data center offers the best
protection to the privacy of PEPs by minimizing the involved intermediaries. Although indirect
sharing could be achieved instead through foreign states or public means (i.e. by each state
establishing its domestic PEPs list and providing the list to foreign states whose financial
institutions are authorized to access, or publicize the list so that financial institutions could
access), both involve expansive disclosure of PEPs’ personal information, thus being more
invasive to the privacy of PEPs.

Due to its decentralization, decentralized international PEP data centers fail to secure accountability to other
states. See id.
97
The data center is required to manage swift and secure access only to the authorized users of the information
which are domestic and foreign financial institutions. Thus, the data center should continuously check and
update its system to protect itself from unauthorized access such as cyber incidents while providing requisite
information timely to financial institutions. Not all states are willing or able to manage the data center in such a
manner.
98
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More importantly, in the matter of how, it should be emphasized that the concern about
privacy rights of PEPs could be significantly addressed by controlling the manner of access by
financial institutions to PEPs’ data.

For this purpose, it is proposed that the disclosure to financial institutions should be
made via a case-specific reactive query matched against the information in possession of
financial institutions so that the extent of the protected PII of PEPs disclosed to the financial
institution could be minimized, or even eliminated. This contrasts with the expansive invasion
to PEPs’ privacy, potentially caused by the proactive disclosure where financial institutions
access the raw input of PII of PEPs as a whole.

Under the case-specific reactive query match, to identify whether certain clients are
PEPs or not, financial institutions would access the PEP data center by filling in PII information
of the client (e.g. names, date of birth, identification numbers, address, phone numbers, etc.)
under their possession presented voluntarily by the client to open an account. The PEP data
center would then provide those financial institutions with the result of their specific query. If
there is a hit-match against the query, the result would include only the information about the
current and prior positions, the dates of appointment and separation, etc. of a specific PEP
which is generally not regarded as information in relation to which public officers have a
legitimate expectation of privacy.

IV. CONCLUSION

Inclusion of domestic PEPs into the FATF Recommendations in February 2012
provides a cornerstone for fulfilling a high degree of coordination along two dimensions—the
trans-border, and between public enforcement entities and private actors—required to
minimize collateral damage to innocent PEPs like Mr. Ocampo and to maximize corruption
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deterrence. The trans-border coordination has been made through the reconciliation of the main
substantive discrepancy on the scope of PEPs—whether to embrace domestic PEPs in addition
to foreign PEP—in global PEPs standards.

However, the public-private coordination of two-way information sharing has thus far
been lacking. While current global AML/PEP regulations require financial institutions to share
their information with public authorities, none of them require governments to share requisite
information in their possession—such as domestic PEP lists—with private financial
institutions. To eliminate the causes of financial institutions’ business judgement—tremendous
compliance costs and difficulties in identifying PEPs and an increased risk of serious fines for
compliance failures—negatively affecting many innocent PEPs while maximizing corruption
deterrence, it is essential that global AML/PEP regulations employ this public-private
coordination of two-way information sharing.

This paper has shown that public-private coordination of two-way information sharing
can be operationalized by mutual recognition for its basic framework. Under this principle of
mutual recognition governing the recognition of foreign administrative decisions, the domestic
PEP lists created by each government would be recognized by foreign financial institutions,
and of course by domestic financial institutions.

For successful implementation of public-private coordination based on mutual
recognition of domestic PEP lists issued by each state, the proposed global AML/PEP
regulatory body establishing the global AML/PEP regulation should respect three essential
values: accountability of states providing the domestic PEP list to foreign states, accountability
to the listed domestic PEPs, and protecting the privacy of PEPs. To do so, the proposed global
AML/PEP regulatory body needs to employ the following: institutional measures to establish
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a centralized international PEP data center with authority to audit and penalize cheating by
states; procedural measures to control the different domestic PEP list making/review
procedures of each state and to provide listed domestic PEPs with a direct channel of petition
for review at the international level; and the procedural measures to allow financial institutions
to access international PEP data center through a case-specific reactive query matched against
the PII information of its client in its possession and to provide financial institutions only the
result of the official position as a PEP.

If these recommendations are adopted, it is contended that the proposed global
AML/PEP regulatory body and its regulations will attain legitimacy and effectiveness to deter
corruption. It is about time to build on the cornerstone.
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